The paper challenges the widespread assumption that the wage effects of federal training programs are reliable and unbiased estimates of productivity effects and social benefits. Evidence is presented that the reputations of government training programs are unreliable and that employers stigmatize those eligible for TJTC and CETA OJT contracts. Graduates of classroom training programs which are known to be funded by JTP A are likely to be similarly stigmatized. TJTC eligibles are seriously underpaid by employers and JTPA graduates may experience a similar fate. Consequently, the true effects of JTP A on the productivity of disadvantaged workers may be considerably larger than its effects on wages. Methods of obtaining estimates of productivity effects are described.
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School.
It is intended to make the results of Center research, conferences, and projects available to others interested inhuman resource management in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions. The assumption that individuals are paid their marginal revenue product has been shown to be invalid. There is, however, another assumption --wages equal expected marginal revenue product --which under some circumstances can justify using wage effects of training as a measure of productivity effects.
ABSTRACT
Under this scenario employers do not know the productivity of individual job applicants, but productivity becomes somewhat visible after a worker has been hired. Wages only partially adjust to reflect the perceived productivity differences between workers at the firm. Empirical evidence suggests that after one year, the elasticity of relative wages to relative productivity is .22 in very small firms and zero at establishments with more than 400 employees. The discrepancy between a worker's productivity and wage rate can be decomposed into 3 elements:
The first term is the worker's "relative productivity", the deviation of the "i"th worker's marginal revenue product net of required training costs (Pij) from the marginal revenue product net of required training costs (Pj) of the average incumbent in the job at the firm. The second term is the worker's "within-job relative wage", the deviation of an individual's wage from the mean for that job at the firm. The last term is the difference between the marginal revenue product net of required training costs of the average incumbent in the job (P~) and the average wage for the job (W~). Of the 2,594 employers who provided data on one new hire, 1,511
had not hired anyone else in that job in the last two years, and 424 had not Each employer surveyed was asked about the training provided to the two new employees, current and starting hourly wage rates and an average wage rate paid to workers with two years of experience, and the productivity of new hires at various points in their tenure. A copy of the relevant portions of the questionnaire can be obtained from the author.
The survey asked the employer (or in larger firms the immediate supervisor) to report on productivity of the typical individual hired in the job after two weeks, during the next 11 weeks and at the end of two years at the firm. The supervisor was asked to do the rating on a "scale of zero to 100 where 100 equals the maximum productivity rating any of your employees in (NAME'S)
position can obtain and zero is absolutely no productivity by Under an assumption that these productivity indexes are proportional transformations of true productivity plus a random error, percentage differences in cell means of the productivity index will be unbiased estimators of percentage differences in true productivity. If the variations in the productivity scores assigned by supervisors exaggerate the proportionate variations in the true productivity, our estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased upward. Even though it is possible for a worker's true productivity to be negative, the scale was defined as having a lower limit of zero. Floors and ceilings on a scale typically cause measurement errors to be negatively correlated with the true value. If this is the case, then our estimates of percentage differences in productivity between two workers will be biased downward. This latter type of bias appears to be more likely than the former. When supervisors and coworkers are giving informal training to a new employee, 28 the trainee is almost invariably involved directly in a production activity.
Employers report that for informal training, the trainees are typically as productive while being trained as they are when working alone.2B Consequently, informal training time is assumed to involve only the investment of the trainer's time.
The training time index is equal to 0.8 times the hours spent watching others do the job plus 1.8 times the hours in formal training plus 1.5 times the hours in training by management plus hours in training by coworkers.
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The arithmetic mean of this index is 147.2 hours, implying that the value of the time invested in training a typical new employee in the first three months is about 28.3 percent of the output that a co-worker would produce in three months.
I obtain estimates of the ex-post profitability of new hire number 1 and new hire number 2 by combining th~data on their wages, productivity and training costs. Because data is not available on costs of training beyond the first three months at the firm, the ex--post profitability variable for the date of the interview or separation is based solely on a comparison of the productivity and wage rate differentials between the two new hires:
The formula for the differential in ex-post profitability during the first three months is:
where ySi~' YCij = Profitability excluding tax credit of the "inth new hire in job "j" during the first three months (8) and at the time of the interview or separation (C). Note that by dividing by PTj, the productivity differential, (pS1j-pB2j), is translated into the metric of the productivity expected from a worker with two years of tenure in job "j". This is also the metric of the training cost differential so the two terms may be summed. .
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A total of 11 additional control variables are not shown in the table. They were:
private vocational school, an interaction of establishment size with relevant vocational education and 6 indicators for referral source. The model of profitability in the first 3 months also contains the date of hire and the date of hire square to control for the effect of inflation on starting wage rates.
The model predicting net benefits at the interview or separation date contains tenure, tenure squared and tenure less than one year. Prior to differencing, the experience and tenure less than one year variables are set equal to 1 if experience or tenure is 1 or greater and set equal to the experience or tenure variable if it is between 0 and 1. A full set of estimation results are available by writing to the author. 
